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Respect for life has been traditional in human society. It is based on
recognition of human life as a basic good. Life is basic to any other go'od a
human may have or acquire. Truth demands that one respect life as such a
good. In our ludaeo-Christian culture this has carried with it several
demands. It has traditionally demanded that no one take innocent human
life. This included not only the life of other innocent people but that of the
person himself or herself. Suicide has been considered as much a violation
of respect for life as homicide.
Euthanasia
It has also been recognized that taking a human life bylO mission is just as
wrong as taking it by commission. Thus no distinction has been made, e.g.,
between intentionally starving a person and stabbing him to death. Even if
this is done with a good intention, e.g., out of mercy, it has been considered
wrong. So what is called euthanasia has always been condemned in our
society, and this is true of voluntary as well as involuntary euthanasia. The
only difference between the two is that voluntary euthanasia would
constitute suicide as well as homicide .
Duty to Preserve Life
Respect for life has also had another dimension . A positive duty to
preserve life has been part of the tradition . This is a duty which runs
through the whole spectrum of human activity. It affects what one eats,
what one drinks, what he wears, what kind of work he does, what kind of
recreation he takes , whenever it involves some risk or danger to life. Again,
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it affects what he does as well as what he does not do. A person can show
his lack of respect for life by omission as well as by commission.
From what has been said above , it should be clear that respect for life
demands that what the person does or does not do never falls into the
category of suicide or homicide . This can happen in two ways: (I) if death
is the only immediate effect of some act or omission; or (2) if death is
intended either as a means or an end .
If death is the only immediate effect of the act or omission, it must
obviously be intended , and therefore must constitute suicide or homicide.
While this is a possibility, it may happen only rarely, since it does not often
happen that an act has only one immediate effect. The more usual case
would be one in which, although the act may have other effects , death is
intended either as a means or an end.
Granted that what is done does not fall into either of these categories, it
has generally been admitted that one does not have to do everything
possible to preserve life. In other words , there are limits to what the person
must do or not do to fulfill this duty. Thus, one does not have to rule out
all danger or risk in the work he does , or even in the recreation he takes.
Nor does one have to take all treatment necessary to preserve or prolong
his life.
Principle of Double Effect
How does one decide, in these cases , what is of obligation and what is
optional? In technical language we are dealing here with what is called the
principle of double effect. In other words , we are dealing with an act which
has a bad effect, and we are asking about the morality of such an act or
omission. We have already pointed out that respect for life does not
demand that we avoid any act or omission that carries with it risk or
danger to life (bad effect). We have also pointed out that it would not be
permitted to engage in such activity with the intention of bringing on
death. But what if the act or omission is placed for som~ other reason?
How would one determine its morality?
Besides the requirements already mentioned regarding intention , this
principle requires that the reason for placing the act or for the omission be
sufficient to justify the evil effect. We can illustrate with the example ofthe
space shuttle. Those who have gone up in it were certainly aware of the risk
to life, yet none of them went up with the intention of ending their lives .
They went up because of the good this program gave hopes of
accomplishing. It was generally felt that this was sufficient to warrant the
risk to life involved . I think it would be generally agreed that, presuming
that known risk was reduced to a minimum, the conditions of the principle
of double effect were verified , and going up was morally permissible.
Nutrition and Hydration
Our concern here is not with any or every act or omission that carries
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with it risk to life, but with a specific act. We are concerned with foregoing
eating and drinking with resulting risk to life or even certain death . The
question is whether and under what circumstances one may withhold /
withdraw nutrition and hydration from a patient.
This question has arisen in recent times in the context of the discussion
that has taken place over the past ten or more years regarding the
obligation to take medical treatment. It is generally agreed that the
obligation to take medical treatment, like the obligation to preserve life,
has its limitations. The question now being asked is whether the duty to eat
and drink has the same limits as medical treatment. Or is there a
difference?
There is clearly a difference between eating and drinking, and med ical
treatment. Medical treatment is aimed at curing a disease. Eating and
drinking are not aimed at curing disease, but at sustaining life. Medical
treatment is therapeutic; eating and drinking are not basically therapeutic.
So there is no doubt that eating and drinking, and medical treatment are
two different procedures, although artificial feeding seems to be a
combination of both.
But this does not answcr our question , which is whether there is a
difference in the obligation to eat and drink , and the obligation to take
medical treatment. The pertinent question is whether the differences
pointed out above are morally relevant, that is, whether they would affect
the moral obligation. Would it, for instance, make the obligation to take
food and drink an absolute one, whereas the obligation to take medical
treatment would remain limited?
Unique Obligation?
It is my contention that there is no difference between these obligations.
As already pointed out, there is one duty to preserve life and that duty
affects everything we do insofar as it involves danger or risk to life. We are
not speaking of two distinct duties , one to eat and drink, the other to take
medical treatment. There is only one duty, the duty to preserve life. and
this duty must be taken into consideration in anything a person does which
involves risk or danger to life. Since this duty has its limitations , these
limitations as well as the duty itself affect everything we do . As pointed
out, it would obviously not be permissible to forego eating and drinking to
bring on death . But if some other reason were present, it could be justified.
] think everyone would admit , for instance, that ifthere were only enough
food and drink for one person , a grandparent could forego eating in favor
of a grandchild , just as he could forego medical treatment, etc. So I do not
think one can say that it would be intrinsically evil to forego eating and
drinking even to the point of death. If the omission can be justified
according to the principle of double effect, it would be morally
permissible. We are not asking here whether foregoing food to save the life
of another can be justified, but whether other reasons can be offered. and
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if so, what reasons.
The moral norm that has been generally accepted is that if what is
omitted is useless in prolonging life or excessively burdensome, and IS
omitted for this reason, it would be morally permissible. 1
Useless Means
If what was omitted was useless, that is, if it would not prolong life
perceptibly, there would obviously be no obligation to use it. If morality is
to be reasonable, one cannot impose an obligation on a person to do
something useless. This would make no sense. Today, however, this
principle is not being properly used. It is used to free one of an obligation
to use means if it would not cure some disease. Thus, if a particular disease
is irreversible, some would want to argue that it would be permissible to
withdraw even nutrition and hydration, since they could not reverse the
disease. But this ignores the whole meaning of the question, which is about
the duty to prolong life, not the duty to cure disease. Obviously, if one were
talking about the latter, one could not directly impose an obligation to eat
and drink ... since it would not cure the disease . In fact, one could never
impose an obligation to eat and drink on this score, since eating and
drinking, as such, are not therapy.
So it makes no sense to relate the obligation of nutrition and hydration
to whether the disease can be reversed or not. The only legitimate reason
for withdrawing it would be that it would not prolong life perceptibly, so
that the patient would die within a short space of time whether he ate or
not.
Burdensome Means
What if a means is excessively burdensome? I n that event a patient
would be permitted to forego the means. This is permissible becaus'e a
humane morality does not place on a patient an obligation that would be
too difficult for him to bear or fulfill. I do not think that a 9Ydistinction can
be made here between treatment and feeding. For a particular patient
eating can be just as difficult as treatment. It would not be reasonable to
demand that such a patient accept one and not the other. Indeed, foregoing
either would be wrong, as pointed out above, if death was the only
immediate effect, or if it was intended . But the assumption is that neither is
or has to be the case. Death is not the only immediate effect. If a means
(treatment or feeding) is excessively burdensome, refusing treatment has
another immediate effect . .. avoiding the burden of the treatment or
feeding . If this is what he intends, omitting eating and drinking could be
justified as a legitimate application of the principle of double effect. He is
not doing something wrong in itself, he does not intend the evil effect, and
he avoids the burden which eating involves.
When theologians speak of a means to preserve life that is excessively
burdensome, they usually break it down into hardship, pain, cost or
danger. lfthe use of some means involved what would be judged excessive
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in any of these areas, a patient would not be obliged to take it. It would be
optional.

Burden to the Family
Ethicians are 0 bviously speaking of burden to the patient. lfthe burden
is to the patient, he is relieved of any obligation to use the means. But
option is not limited to the patient. A patient would be free to omit a means
to preserve life even if he did so to remove a burden from the family. If a
patient had no insurance, and he wanted to spare the family the
astronomic costs some treatments involve today, it would be permissible
for him to do so. In fact, he might be more concerned about the burden to
his family than the burden to himself.

Burden to Society
In today's society, the burden of cost is usually shifted to some insurance
company or to society, if he is on medicare or medicaid. So the patient
cannot often omit treatment because of the burden of cost to himself.
Would it be permissible for him to omit treatment because of the cost to
the insurance company, or to society? This is certainly a possibility. But it
is not likely to happen. At least I have never heard of anyone who refused
treatment because of the cost to an insurance company, or to society, if he
was on medicare or medicaid . So although it could happen, it would be
difficult to make any such presumption in the case of an incompetent
patient.

Scarce Facilities
What about society itself? Could it terminate treatment even against the
wishes of a patient? Society has the right and duty to distribute its own
funds. Since it never has enough funds to cover all the needs of a
community, it must set limits. It would be permissible for society then to
limit the funds given to health care both in general and in "articular cases ...
as long as it observes distributive justice. But even in a situation where it
might legitimately limit funds, it could not legitimately stop treatment
itself. If the treatment could be provided from other funding, society
could not stop it. The only situation in which society could stop treatment
would be one in which treatment facilities themselves were scarce. There
society could set limits.
Even in this situation, however, society would be bound by moral
norms. It would be no more permissible for society to intend the death of
a patient than it would for the patient himself. So while society may limit
treatment , it may not do so with the intention of ending the life of a
patient. Society also has the obligation of not discriminating against
patients.
The fact is that society has not set such limits , so the above discussion is
purely theoretical. I do not think that a court could make a decision on
this basis. Since it is dealing with only one case, it would be impossible to
February, 1987
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avoid discrimination .
Briefly, what we are saying is that it is permissible to forego means to
preserve life when the use of such means would not appreciably preserve
life or when, even if it would, it would be excessively burdensome. It would
not be permissible to forego means to preserve life with the intention of
bringing on death.

Quality of Means vs. Quality of Life
Today this whole discussion has entered into a new phase. In the past, as
described above, the emphasis was on the means. Sometimes the
distinction was made between ordinary and extraordinary means to clarify
the obligation of preserve life. In the past five or ten years a new emphasis
has been added. Some are looking not only at the means, but the person.
They would like to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary
patients, as well as ordinary and extraordinary means . The underlying
reason is that they would like to make an allowance for extraordinary
patients, just as they make for extraordinary means. In other words, they
would like to withhold or withdraw treatment on the basis of the quality of
life of the patient as well as the quality of means. Thus, if the quality of life
of the patient was below a certain standard they would argue that the
means of preserving life could be withheld or withdrawn .
Superficially, it would seem that if one could withhold means on the
basis of the quality of the means , it could be done on the basis of the quality
of the patient's life . Thus , if one could withhold means because they are
useless or excessively burdensome , it would seem that one should be able
to withhold them if the patients's life itself is useless or excessively
burdensome. Actually, I know of no one who would want to make this
simple transfer. In general , advocates of this approach are usually much
more demanding in dealing with quality oflife than they are with quality of
means. They would argue , for instance, that if a person were in an
irreversible coma or a persistent vegetative state, it would be permissible to
withhold means to preserve life, including food and hydration. They
would not include other incapacitating handicaps . Similarly, they might
argue that if the patient's life was extremely burdensome, not just
excessively burdensome , it would be permissible to withhold means to
preserve life.

New Moral Category
What about the morality of this argument? As already indicated , it
might look as though this wasjust another step in the same direction. And
this is part ofthe problem .. . the move may not be recognized for what it is.
Actually, it represents a quantum leap from what is and has been
considered acceptable. It is not in any way in continuity with past practice ,
but involves a move into an entirely different category of moral act. Let me
illustrate . When one withholds or withdraws a means to preserve life
because it is too burdensome , his intention is to spare the patient the
22
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burden somehow involved in the use of the means. There is no intention of
bringing on the death of the patient. Even if the patient lives (as in the
Quinlan case), the goal is achieved. He or she is spared the burdensome
means.
But if one omits some necessary means because of the patient's low
quality oflife, the intention is to bring the life of the patient to an end, since
this is the only solution of the problem. Presumably, the patient's
condition cannot be reversed, so the only solution is the death of the
patient.
What this means is that we are omitting treatment, etc., with the
intention of bringing on death. In other words , we are violating our duty to
respect life. As we mentioned ea-rlier in this paper, respect for life demands
that we do nothing (and omit nothing) that involves danger or risk to life
with the intention of bringing on death. The fact that it is being done with
good intention, to end the patient's pain , does not change the basic nature
of the act. It is euthanasia.
This has been defined as an act or omission
\
which by nature or by intention brings on the death of the patient out of
mercy. 2 Both the moral and civil law have always abhorred euthanasia.
Killing is killing whether it is done with a good intention or not.
Moral Sensitivity

Awareness of the magnitude of the step from quality of treatment to
quality of life is crucial to moral sensitivity in this area. The introduction of
moral evil into society can be and often is imperceptible, and one can easily
be lulled into a false sense of security if he underestimates what look like
small steps. The astronaut who first stepped on to the moon said that it was
just a small step for a man, but he and everyone else knew that it was a giant
step for mankind. The same has to be said for the step into quality of life
reasoning. It may look like a small step, but in reality it is a giant moral
step. One is entering into an entirely different category of moral act . ..
intentionally bringing on death . If one makes this m<tve under the illusion
that it is a small step and in continuity with the past, he will be blissfully,
but also sadly, ignorant of the disastrous implications of what he is doing.
He is leaping in the dark. What is even worse is the failure to realize that
this leap will land him on a slippery slope, and with no braking power.
It would be bad enough if we could limit this quality of life move to an
extreme case of rare occurrence. For the reason given above, the truth is
that we have no effective way of controlling it, or of drawing a legitimate
line. In other words, there is no acceptable or manageable criterion that
can be used to justify withdrawal of treatment in some cases and
legitimately exclude it in others. Once the line between quality of treatment
and quality of life is crossed , there is no effective way of drawing another
line. As pointed out above, we are on a slippery slope with no braking
power. Today, we are intentionally ending the life of a person in an
irreversible coma or a persistent vegetative state. Tomorrow, it will be the
person with Alzheimer's disease. The next day , any Alzheimer's chronic
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mental patient will qualify. Then, or even before, incapacitating physical
handicaps will be considered. There is no way in which one can take the
first step, or the second step and stop there. This threat is aggravated by the
fact that the judgment in these cases is made mostly by third parties, with
all the hazards this implies. We will eventually or sooner find ourselves in a
society in which only those with an optimal qual it y of life will be secure . ..
the opposite to <' democratic society in which all are considered equal.
That this is nl.t alljust fantasy is clear from a recent art icl e in the Nell'
England Journal oj' Medicine . 3 There the statement is made that it is
ethically permissible to withhold nutrition administered by .. . gastr ic tu be
from "severely and irreversibly demented patients" as we ll as from the
"pleasantly senile."

Wishes of Patient
What if the patient had made a li ving will , or indicated in some othe r
way that if he or she is ever in an irreversible or in curable condition, he
does not want treatment, even artificia l feeding? It is quite true that the
decision regarding treatment is up to the patient. But from a moral
perspective, the patient is not at liberty to decline all and any treatment,
especially nutrition and hydration. If a patient foregoes treatment that is
not burdensome and will prolong life, he is going beyond his legitimate
option, and violating his duty to respect life. Even if a patient were to make
such a request. those responsible for her could not condone it or freely
cooperate with it. This, of course, puts the attending physician in a difficult
position, at least from a legal perspective. What is clear is that a request by
the patient will not justify the omission of treatment when this would be
immoral.

Hopeless Case
Advocates of a quality of life approach to justify withdrawing means to
preserve life will frequently give as their reason the fact hat a particular
case is hopeless. Hopeless can frequently mean many things. If it means '
that there is no hope of cure, it cannot be a va lid reason for withdrawing
the means to preserve life. Many diseases are incurable, e.g., diabetes, but
no one would suggest that one should not give a diabetic insulin because
the disease cannot be cured. So the fact that the condition cannot be cured
is not in itself the reason for withdrawing treatment. When a case is called
hopeless in the present context. it seems to mean not only that the
condition is not curable, but that the quality of life of the patient is so low
that it is useless to continue it. Again we are dealing with a quality of life
reason in which the solution is the death of the patient.
It is also argued that means to preserve life, including feeding, may be
removed when the patient is in what is called a persistent vegetat ive state.
Whether a human being who is still alive can be said to be in a persistent
vegetative state can be seriously challenged. As long as a human soul is
present (and this is the case until the patient is at least brain-dead) human
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life is present. It is not just vegetative life. Also , the only thing we are sure
about in these cases is that the patient cannot communicate with the
outside world . We are not at all sure that he or she cannot receive some
communication from outside. Nor can we rule out some kind of interior
life. To say that there is only vegetative life in a human being who is still
alive goes beyond any evidence we have .

'Natural' Death
Some will want to argue that prolonging life by treatment or artificial
feeding is putting off the natural time of death, and so cannot be
obligatory. Before accepting this objection, which really proves more than
the opposition would want, one would have to know the answer to the
question: when is death natural? If we go back into the Old Testament, we
will come to a time when any kind of human interventioJ;l in disease was
considered interfering with Divine Providence. I believe it was the prophet
Sirach who argued that yod created the herbs and the drugs, just as He
created food and drink , and endowed the doctor with knowledge to cure
the sick , and so wanted us to use them just as we use His other gifts. So
prolonging life by using these gifts is not interfering with Divine
Providence, but really cooperating with it.
Noone today would argue that all therapy involves interference with
nature or Divine Providence. But some even today seem to want to
maintain that there are times , such as in the case of a person in a persistent
vegetative state, when one should withdraw and let nature take its course.
We have already pointed out that there are times when treatment is
optional, but this is because the treatment is useless or excessively
burdensome. We do not judge it optional because, in a particular case, we
think a judgment can be made that death is natural. I know of no way of
making such ajudgment except in the case where death is going to occur in
a short time whether treatment is used or not. But this kind of judgment is
neither necessary nor helpful. So it makes no sense to, talk about putting
off natural death .

Intending Death or Letting Die
In the same vein, some will maintain that in these cases they are not
intending death, but letting death occur or letting nature take its course.
There is certainly a clear distinction between intending and permitting or
allowing. One who omits a burdensome treatment to spare the patient the
burden of the treatment does not intend the death of the patient. If death
happens , he merely permits it. But one who withholds or withdraws the
means to preserve life to let death occur is not just a passive observer. What
he does or fails to do is instrumental in bringing about the death of the
patient. This is especially true in the case offeeding. If the patient dies . one
cannot say that the death comes from the original disease. He dies of
starvation. And even in the case where some treatment is stopped ,
although the disease may ultimately account for the death of the patient.
February, 1987
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the omission of the treatment brings it about sooner, thus shortening the
patient's life. It is quite true that an act or omission from which death
results is not in itself immoral. It is when this is done precisely to end or
shorten the life of the patient that it becomes immoral. Since this is what
happens when some means to preserve life is not provided or withdrawn, it
is our contention that it constitutes intentional euthanasia by omission.
Briefly, then , even ifone does not place some positive act of violence, but
simply omits something necessary to preserve life, he cannot say that he is
just letting death occur, or letting nature take its course. If death results
from his failure to do something he can easily do, and this is his intention,
he is doing more than just letting it happen. He intends what happens
because this is the solution to his problem. And this is immoral.
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